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Executive Summary
The objective of this paper is to analyse how the competition authorities in the Czech
republic, Poland and Hungary (CPH) have dealt with the interface between trade and
competition in their actual practice.
Competition authorities are confronted with issues of  trade and more generally issues
of economic integration in various ways.   First,  and most fundamentally, competition
authorities need to consider the exercise of their  jurisdiction over cases with an international
dimension.   The exercise of jurisdiction is constrained by domestic legal frameworks as well
as international treaties and rules.     For the countries under review, the Europe agreements
with the European Union (EU) provide the only conventional (Treaty) framework for the
exercise of jurisdiction.   Accordingly, we consider how domestic competition authorities
have exercised jurisdiction within this framework and more generally whether this framework
has operated well.
We find there has not been any conflict in the allocation of jurisdiction between CPH
on the one hand and the EU on the other hand.   The Europe agreements have however been
largely dormant even at the level of consultation and the absence of conflict is probably
associated,  to some extent, with limited integration between the EU and the countries under
review so that few cases could have arisen in the first place.  The absence of conflict is also
probably associated with a fairly favourable, if not permissive, attitude towards foreign firms
in CPH so that few European firms have complained to the EU.   That is not say however that
the Europe  agreements had not effect.  Clearly, for antitrust authorities in Central Europe, the
prospect that they may have to implement European law in addition to their own law has
given them as strong incentive to approximate the latter with the former.   Hence, the Europe
agreement will probably be remembered by economic historians more as tool to foster
convergence in anti-trust practice than an instrument to regulate the allocation of jurisdiction.
Second, competition authorities face the delineation of the relevant market in its
geographic dimension.   The relevant market will be dependent on the extent to which
competitors located at different locations act as competitive constraints on one another in the
short term. Competition agencies will also typically consider international competition in the
assessment of dominance.  In particular, when the relevant market has been delineated as
national, the extent to which large domestic firms will be able to raise price will be affected
by the prospect of entry by domestic but also foreign firms.  The analysis of the entry barriers
that potential competitors abroad would face will thus be an important issue in the assessment
of dominance.
The definition of the relevant geographic market suffers from significant shortcomings
in each country under review, but to a different degree. Overall, there is a general bias in
favour of narrow market definition.  In the Czech republic, the legal framework introduces the
presumption of a prohibition for mergers on the basis of a market share in the domestic
economy.  This framework does not allow for mergers meeting the threshold to be waived
simply because the relevant market is broader than the Czech republic.   In Poland, there is at3
times a bit of a confusion between geographic market definition and the analysis of
dominance.  In Hungary, foreign competition is only considered as a relevant factor to assess
dominance.   A proper market definition, which fully recognises the importance of foreign
competition would allow for an evaluation of competition which is better informed.  In Poland
and Hungary, the shortcomings of the current approach could be easily remedied.   From this
prospective, it would useful for the antitrust agencies to adopt a clear definition of what is
meant by the relevant market for instance through a set of published guidelines.
Third, beyond their prime responsibility in the implementation of the competition
statutes, antitrust authorities often play an important role in terms of competition advocacy.
Competition advocacy by the antitrust authorities is an essential counter-weight against the
many organised lobbies wishing to reduce competition for the sake of appropriating rents.
Protection from foreign competition is of course an area where organised lobbies are
particularly active and often successful.   The antitrust authorities thus have an important role
to play in the formulation of trade policies and we seek to assess  the role that they have
played.
We observe that anti-trust agencies have attempted to advocate competition in the
formulation of trade policy.   The evolution of their independence is however mixed.  There
are some worrying signs that the Polish agency has become less independent whereas the
Hungarian agency has probably become even more independent.
Finally, competition authorities often pursue objectives that may be broader than
simply maintaining effective competition in the domestic market. Industrial policy is one of
these considerations which might sneak in competition decisions in a more or less open
fashion.  The treatment that will be reserved to foreign firms is the particular breed of
industrial policy that is of interest to us.  On the one hand, there may be a tendency for
antitrust authorities to favour foreign direct investments because they expect that they will
bring about wider benefits like technology transfers.  On the other hand, there may be a
concern that control over domestic activities will be lost to foreign investors and this concern
may lead to a bias against foreign direct investment.
It appears that anti-trust agencies in all three countries could indeed be pursuing
objectives of industrial policy in the exercise of merger control.   The situation gives rise to
particular concern in Poland  where the suspicion arises that profitable market positions have
been auctioned off to foreign buyers in exchange for commitments which are unrelated to the
competitive situation.   In the other two countries,  it seems that the attitude towards foreign
firms has been quite favourable.    For instance, the prospect for restructuring or technology
transfer associated with foreign ownership is often cited as a benefit which can trump
concerns about reduction of effective competition.4
1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to analyse how the competition authorities in Poland,
Hungary and the Czech republic have dealt with the interface between trade and competition
in their actual practice.
Competition authorities are confronted with issues of  trade and more generally with
issues of economic integration in various ways.     First,  and most fundamentally,
competition authorities need to consider the exercise of their  jurisdiction over cases with an
international dimension.   The exercise of jurisdiction is constrained by domestic legal
frameworks as well as international treaties and rules.     For the countries under review, the
Europe agreements with the European Union (EU) provide the only conventional (Treaty)
framework for the exercise of jurisdiction.   It will be important to consider how domestic
competition authorities have exercised jurisdiction within this framework and more generally
whether this framework has operated well.
Second, competition authorities face the delineation of the relevant market in its
geographic dimension.   The relevant market will be dependent on the extent to which
competitors located at different locations act as competitive constraints on one another in the
short term.  Market definition is an essential step in the assessment of antitrust cases, not only
in the assessment of mergers but also in the analysis of anti-competitive agreements and
potential abuse of dominance.  Often, the delineation of the relevant market in its geographic
dimension will also reduce to the choice between a small set of alternatives; in particular,
whether the relevant market is national or includes several countries will thus often be the
focus of attention.  The extent to which foreign firms might constrain the exercise of market
power in the domestic economy will then be a central issue.     It will be important to consider
how competition authorities have handled the issue.
Third, competition agencies will typically also consider international competition in
the assessment of dominance.  In particular, when the relevant market has been delineated as
national, the extent to which large domestic firms will be able to raise price will be affected
by the prospect of entry by domestic but also foreign firms.  The analysis of the entry barriers
that potential competitors abroad would face will thus be an important issue in the assessment5
of dominance.     Here again, it will be important to consider how competition agencies have
handled the issue.
Fourth, beyond their prime responsibility in the implementation of the competition
statutes, antitrust authorities often play an important role in terms of competition advocacy.
This role is arguably particularly important in developing and transition economies where
market mechanisms may not be firmly established or even well understood.   But even in
mature market economies, competition advocacy by the antitrust authorities is an essential
counter-weight against the many organised lobbies wishing to reduce competition for the sake
of appropriating rents.   Protection from foreign competition is of course an area where
organised lobbies are particularly active and often successful.   The antitrust authorities thus
have an important role to play in the formulation of trade policies and we will seek to assess
the role that they have played.
Finally, competition authorities often pursue objectives that may be broader than
simply maintaining effective competition in the domestic market.  Such broader objectives
may be explicitly assigned to them (market integration being a case in point for the EU), but
they may also be led to pursue these objectives by other constituencies and allowed to do so
because of ineffective mechanisms of accountability.    Industrial policy is one of these
considerations which might sneak in competition decisions in a more or less open fashion.
The treatment that will be reserved to foreign firms is the particular breed of industrial policy
that will be interest to us.  On the one hand, there may be a tendency for antitrust authorities
to favour foreign direct investment because they expect that it will bring about wider benefits
like technology transfers.  On the other hand, there may be a concern that control over
domestic activities will be lost to foreign investors and this concern may lead to a bias against
foreign direct investment.
In what follows, we will review the activities of the competition authorities of Poland,
Hungary and the Czech republic in the last four years.  We will focus on the issues just
identified where the interface between competition and economic integration appears to be
most important.     We will take each country in turn and for each country, we will organise
our discussion around three themes, namely the analysis of foreign competition in market
definition and the analysis of dominance, the role of advocacy in the formulation of foreign6
economic policy and the attitude towards foreign firms.   The relative attention which is given
to each of these themes will however vary across countries.
To the extent that the framework for the exercise of jurisdiction in the context of the
Europe Agreements is the same for the three countries concerned, we will also discuss this
framework and its operation at the outset (section 2).
Some brief outline of our methodology may also be useful.   Our review of the work
undertaken by competition authorities
1 is mostly based on the analysis of actual decisions and
interviews with the competition authorities.   We have also interviewed officials at the
Competition directorate of the European Commission and the OECD as well as some anti-
trust practitioners.
For each country, we have made a first selection of cases on the basis of the
publications of the antitrust authorities.  We have then asked the authorities to make their own
selection and we have validated their choice through an interview.     Our analysis of the cases
thereby selected is based primarily on the published decisions.   In many instances, only a
summary version of the decision, or none at all, was available in English.    Hence, we had to
find partners or associates who were fluent in the original language and competent in modern
antitrust analysis.  We discussed the content of the full decisions directly with them
2.    Cases
were then also discussed directly with the antitrust authorities.
Several benchmarks have been used for the assessment of the decisions taken by the
competition authorities.   First, we have considered the consistency of the decisions both
internally (in terms of the reasoning proposed in individual decisions) and across decisions.
Second, we have considered whether the economic analysis proposed in the decisions being
reviewed is convincing, in terms of reasoning and in terms of the evidence presented to
support the arguments.  The type of reasoning and evidence which is usually presented in
other jurisdictions that we are familiar with (in particular the EU, but also some member
states) is an implicit benchmark in this evaluation.    It should be stressed however that we are
                                                                
1 We have focused on the activities of the competition agencies which account for the bulk of antitrust decisions
in the countries under review.  However, for the cases that we have analysed,  we have also considered, if any,
the  decisions made on appeal.
2 We preferred this solution over the alternative of having the decisions translated.    Indeed,  important details or
nuances are often lost in the process of translation by professionals who are not familiar with antitrust analysis.7
not in a position to judge whether  decisions were “right”.    All we can do is to evaluate the
quality of the arguments that were put forward,  recognising that other arguments that were or
were not considered by the antitrust authorities could be decisive.
2. The exercise of jurisdiction
The exercise of jurisdiction in international matters can appeal to various principles
(see Neven and Mavroidis, 1999, for  a discussion of the issue).    In the area of antitrust, most
countries currently adhere to the so called “effects doctrine”.  According to this approach, a
country can exercise jurisdiction whenever effects of an activity are being felt within its
territory.    Effects can be felt with respect to inbound or outbound trade.  In the former case,
the Competition Authority asserting jurisdiction does so in order to counteract negative
effects stemming from imports in its own market;  in the latter, in order to address negative
effects against its exports to foreign markets.
3
The legal framework of both Poland and the Czech republic have make clear reference
to this principle from their inception in the early nineties.     For instance, Art. 2.3 of the Act
on the Protection of Economic Protection in the Czech republic (from January 30, 1991
4)
states that “The act shall also apply to activities or conduct abroad as long as the effects
thereof influence the domestic market”.   Similarly, Art. 1.2 of the Act on Competition and
Consumer Protection in Poland stipulates that “The act governs the rules and measures of
counteracting competition restricting practices and anti-competitive concentrations of
entrepreneurs and associations thereof, where such practices or concentrations cause or may
cause effects on the territory of the Republic of Poland”
5.  On both occasions, the effects
doctrine is limited to inbound trade.
The situation in Hungary is different.  The first version of the law (20 November
1990) did not contain such a provision.  Its first article indicated that “This Act shall apply to
economic activities of entrepreneurs on the territory of the republic of Hungary, unless
                                                                
3 It is submitted that the former case has stronger links with the territoriality principle which is the governing
principle when it comes to asserting jurisdiction and hence on most occasions such exercise of jurisdiction is in
conformity with public international law.  In the later case, the links with the territoriality  principle are
substantially weaker and hence conformity with international law is problematic.
4 Amended by Acts 495/1992 and 286/1993.
5 Wording from the new draft law currently presented to the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers.
Earlier versions contained a similar provision, see Fingleton et al (1996).8
otherwise provided by any other act”.    Hence, it appears that economic activities taking
place abroad were not covered even if they had effects on the Hungarian territory.   This has
been recognised as a problem by the Hungarian authorities in the context of international
mergers
6.  Accordingly, the Hungarian law was amended and since January 1, 1997, the law
covers (article 1)  “market practices of undertakings carried out abroad if they may have
effects on the Territory of the Republic of Hungary”.
Hence, all three countries now adhere to the effects doctrine and have exercised
jurisdiction over “inbound trade” (practices abroad having effects on their territory).
However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the countries has so far exercised jurisdiction
over foreign practices which affect its exports (“outbound” trade).  The Czech competition
agency has even taken the view that its legal framework, in its current wording, would not
allow it to assert jurisdiction over such cases.
To the extent that the effects of particular practices extend over several jurisdictions
and to the extent that such jurisdictions operate according to the effects principle,  there will
be a simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction.    International agreements are meant to regulate, or
at least organise,  such instances of  overlapping jurisdiction.   For the countries under review,
the Europe Agreements between themselves and the EU  is the most important piece of
legislation which contains provisions for the exercise of jurisdiction in antitrust matters.
With respect to this issue, the Europe Agreements signed with Poland, the Czech
republic and the Hungary are virtually identical.   In what follows, we will refer to the
provisions relating to the agreement with the Czech republic but they apply mutatis mutandis
to the other two countries.   We first review the main characteristics of this agreement and
subsequently discuss their operation.
2.1. Jurisdiction under the Europe Agreement
Art. 64  of the Europe Agreements stipulate that whenever trade between the EU and
the Czech republic is affected,  antitrust enforcement with respect to agreement, abuse of
dominance and state aids in the territories of the two signatories shall take place in accordance
                                                                
6 See for instance the annual report on competition law developments, January 96-June 97, which cites the Ciba-
Geigy/ Sandoz merger as a case in point.9
with the criteria laid down in EC competition law (Arts. 81ff. as numbered in the Treaty of
Amsterdam) and its case law.    Hence, although substance is regulated, the procedural vehicle
necessary to implement it  is not elaborated
7.
A series of discussions took subsequently place between officials of competition
authorities concerned aiming at providing such procedural vehicle
8.
Finally, the Implementing Rules were adopted in 1996 (see Decision of the
Association Council between the EC and the Czech Republic OJ L 31 of 9.2.1996 at pp.
21ff.).  The Implementing Rules provide the procedural vehicle to be used in antitrust cases of
mutual interest.
The Implementing Rules provide for symmetric obligations in antitrust enforcement
relating to each and every conceivable case, except for mergers :  with respect to the latter,
asymmetric obligations binding only the EC are incorporated.
With respect to non-merger antitrust enforcement, Art. 4 of the Implementing Rules
provides for a ‘positive comity’-type of obligation, whereby one of the signatories can request
information relating to cases properly before the other signatory and where the latter
competition authority has decided to exercise jurisdiction.  Such flow of information aims at
ensuring that the point of view of the affected competition authority will be in time taken into
account by the authority exercising jurisdiction.  On the other hand, Arts. 2 and 3 provide that
when a competition authority of one signatory is dealing with a case likely to affect the
interests of the other party, even in the absence of an Art. 4 notification, it must inform the
other party of the case at hand (Art. 3).  The objective is to end up with a mutually satisfactory
solution (Art. 2).
                                                                
7 There is a noticeable discrepancy between the Draft and the Final Agreement Establishing the Free Trade Area
between the European Community (EC) and the Czech Republic, the former opting for more far reaching
obligations than the latter.
8 An informal document dated 15.3.1995 explores the possibility for the two competition authorities to co-
operate in (I) cases where both the EC Commission and competition authority of the respective country have
jurisdiction;  (ii) cases within the competence of one authority but where the interest of the other party may be
significantly affected;  (iii) cases of negative conflict of competence.  It must be noted of course, that it is not
always clear what the exact point of departure is:  there is substantial disagreement among both practitioners and
academics as to the permissible extent of national jurisdiction.  Since at the end of the day reasonableness has to
be exercised in this context, practice reveals quite divergent attitudes with respect to extraterritorial enforcement
of national antitrust laws.10
In cases where no mutually satisfactory solution can be reached, the case will be
referred to the Association Council which can recommend an appropriate course of action
(Art. 9).
With respect to mergers enforcement, the  National Competition Authority  is
endowed with the right to express its views on cases handled by DG IV and which affect the
domestic interests.  The Commission (DG IV) is under the unambiguous legal obligation to
take into account the opinion of the  National  Authority, without however being obliged to
follow it (Art. 7 of the Implementing Rules).
2.2. The operation of the agreement
In Poland and the Czech republic,  neither the Europe Agreements nor the
Implementing Rules were challenged and both are in principle enforced.  It appears however
that the Europe Agreements with respect to these countries are largely dormant.     According
to the Czech competition authority, there has not been a single case between the Czech
Republic and the EU before the Association Council.     It also appears that neither the EU nor
the Czech authorities have requested information from one another.    With respect to Poland,
communication between the antitrust agency and the EU has also been very limited.
Recently however a complaint has been lodged with the   Commission  regarding an (vertical)
agreement which affects trade with Poland.    It appears that the EU has applied the comity
principle envisaged in the agreement and that the case may soon come in front of the
Association Council.
The situation in Hungary is more intricate to the extent that both the antitrust
provisions of its Europe Agreements and the Implementing Rules have been challenged in
front of the constitutional court.  The plaintiff (a well known Professor of Law) first claimed
that the Europe Agreements implied a breach of  the Hungary sovereignty to the extent that it
was committing Hungary to apply a law that had been formulated by another party and which
was also bound to evolve without allowing a representation of Hungarian interests.     The
Hungarian Constitutional Court ruled in 1998 that the Europe Agreementa were not anti-
constitutional but added that the competition office should not be allowed to implement EU
law, because it could not be presumed that Hungarian firms are aware of  the European law.11
The second challenge, against the Implementing Rules,  focused on the status of the
competition agency (as well as the principle of block exemptions).   The Constitutional Court,
in line with the spirit of its earlier ruling, indicated that to entrust the competition agency with
the implementation of EU law  was anti-constitutional.  However,  the Court did not annul the
Implementing Rules directly and offered a grace period.  This grace period has elapsed on
January 1
st 2000 and a request to extend it is pending in front of the Court.
Hence, the allocation of jurisdiction in antitrust matters between Hungary and the EU
is a bit unclear at the moment and it does not seem that a minor adjustment to the agreement
would suffice to meet the concerns of the Constitutional Court (with respect to the
implementation of a case law the evolution of which is not subject to any form of Hungarian
control).    This matter will however become obsolete at the time of membership and may not
be worth adjusting within that horizon.
 Still, it appears that paradoxically the agreement has been less dormant with Hungary
than with the other countries.  The EU has received complaints in two important cases: an
agreement in the distribution of beer involving a community firm and one concerning one of
the two merger prohibitions ever ruled by the Hungarian authority which involved MATAV,
the incumbent telephone operator in Hungary.   In both cases, the EU requested information
but did not pursue the matter further.
3.   Poland
The Polish Anti-monopoly office (AMO) was created in 1990 at the outset of
transition.  It had broad responsibility for promoting  “the conditions for the development and
protection of competition, and counteracting the monopolistic practices on the territory of
Poland”.    The basic statutes prohibited the abuse of dominant positions and agreements
restricting competition and allowed for merger control (see Fingleton, Fox, Neven and
Seabright (1996), for a detailed discussion).    A couple of amendments have been made to the
original statute up until 1996 and dealt mostly with the provisions relating to abuse of
dominance.
A major modification of the statute took place in 1996 (and was implemented as of 1
October 1996).     The AMO was replaced by the Office for Competition and Consumer12
Protection (OCCP).   The mandate of this new institution has thus been enlarged to include
issues of consumer protection.    The catalogue of monopolistic practices has been expanded
to include the  « creation of adverse conditions for consumer claims ».   Furthermore, the
“State Supervision of Commerce”  (Panstwowa Inspekcja Handlowa) has been subordinated
to the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection
9.    This agency is in charge of
monitoring prices at the retail (and wholesale) level but also of monitoring the extent to which
sellers comply with various regulations like sanitary rules which have little to do with
antitrust rules.
The significance of this change should however not be overemphasised.  Indeed, it
appears that even prior to 1996, the AMO effectively dealt with a large number of cases of
consumer protection.   As indicated in the 1995 report of the AMO, prior to 1996, there were
two institutions dealing with customer protection, namely the AMO and the Department of
consumer protection on monopolised markets.   Still about 70 % of all cases of customer
protection were already handled by the AMO in 1995.
Yet another change in the statute is currently being prepared.  The new law is meant to
move closer to the corresponding European Statute (Arts. 81, 82 and the merger regulation)
and even anticipates some of the changes that are currently discussed in the White Paper on
the reform of Art. 81.   As discussed below (section 3), the provisions of the new statute
however tend to move apart from the EU benchmark whit respect to the treatment of
efficiency defence in merger control.
As indicated by table 2, the workload of the agency with respect to agreements and
abuse of dominance (which include consumer protection) did not increase until 1998.   A
large increase in complaints still took place during 1998 and, according to the agency, is
mostly associated with issues of consumer protection.
                                                                
9 Since the first of January 1999, the State Supervision of Commerce has been renamed as Trade Inspection.13
Table 1 :  Merger control - Poland
1996 1997 1998
Number of cases … 1387 1872
Violation found 1 2 1
Violation not found 374 1225
10 1510
Table 2 : Agreements and abuses of dominance - Poland
1996 1997 1998
Proceedings instituted ex officio 27 45 38
Proceedings instituted on motion 164 165 268
Violation found 79 73 124
Violation not found or proceeding
discontinued
63 70 136
The activities of the agency also increased markedly during the period in the area of
merger control (the number of cases more than tripled over two years – see table 1).    This
increase is presumably associated with the wave of restructuring and privatisation which
occurred rather belatedly (relative to other transition economies) in that period.    It is also
remarkable that so few violations were found during that period; indeed, during the previous
four years, as many as 18 violations were found, out of 21 formal decisions that were taken
(see Fingleton et al.  (1996)).
                                                                
10 The relatively big difference between the number of cases examined and the number of opinions issued is a
result of the fact that often the issuance of opinion was immaterial since when a specific case was examined, it
turned out that the concerned undertakings  were under no obligation to inform the office of their intention to
merge, or when the case was examined the parties renounced their earlier notified intention to  merge.14
Table 3 : Resources of the polish competition office
Number of
employees
As of 31 Dec. 1996 As of 31 Dec. 97 As of 31 Dec. 98
Headquarters 102 112 123
Representations 65 69 69
Total 167.75 181 192
Overall, this enhanced activity has also taken place with a modest increase in
resources (see table 3).   Between the end of 1995 (159 employees as reported by Fingleton et
al.  (1996)) and the end of 1998, the staff has increased by about 20 %.    Interestingly, it also
appears that the average seniority of the officials (as measured by their tenure in office) has
increased significantly over time.    Total resources have also more than doubled over time (in
terms of EUROs – from 1.45 million in 1995 to about 3 million in 1998).    This increase
presumably reflects to some extent the evolution of salaries for skilled personnel during the
period but is also affected by the appreciation of Sloty.
3.1.  Foreign competition
In the cases being reviewed, the AMO has never taken the view that the relevant
market was broader than Poland but it has taken into account the effect of foreign competition
in a number of cases.
First, in the acquisition of  Polam-Pabianice SA by  Philips Lighting Holding
11, the
AMO  considered the market for light bulbs.   It took the view that concentration had to be
assessed "not only in the domestic market, but also with the European market in mind".
Effectively, the AMO observed that the merged entity would have a dominant position in the
Poland with a market share around 80 %.  But the AMO also observed that the imports
accounted for 10 % and that import duties on light bulbs were not large (11 % from Russia
and CIES countries and none from the EU and CEFTA countries).  On the basis of this
                                                                
11 See for instance annual report 1996.15
evidence, the AMO cleared the concentration, which in its view would also bring large
benefits to the Polish economy (see section 3.3. below).
The approach followed by the AMO in this decision is not clearly articulated.  In
particular, it is not clear whether  it considered that the relevant market was Poland or  a
broader area (the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) or CEFTA and the EU).
The decision might be interpreted as suggesting that Poland was the relevant market but that
long term entry would not allow the merged entity to exercise market power.  Yet, the
existence of imports and the low level of import duties are factors which are more relevant for
substitution in the short term than entry in the medium/long term.    On balance, given the
evidence provided, it may have been more sensible for the AMO to conclude that the relevant
market was CEFTA and to perform its analysis of domiance in that market.   It is still doubtful
however whether the evidence being provided was sufficient to conclude that the market is
broader than Poland.  This is especially so since an import share of 10 % is relatively small.
In any event, it seems that the A MO should have paid more attention to the
competitive situation in CEFTA.   Indeed, it appears that three large multinationals carved up
the CEFTA market for lights bulbs; in addition to the Philips acquisition in Poland, General
Electric acquired the main supplier in Hungary and Osram acquired the main supplier in the
Czech republic.     The  CEFTA market is thus characterised by a high concentration with
three large suppliers each holding a substantial part of overall  market and by a large amount
of geographical specialisation.  Whether the acquisitions by the multinationals were co-
ordinated is not clear, but the outcome is certainly one that is a matter of concern in terms of
collective dominance.   That is, the respective positions of the firms (in terms of size and
geographical distribution) create conditions that may be favourable for tacit co-ordination.
In the  Steelmill case
12, the AMO was confronted with a complaint lodged by a
purchaser of acid resistant steel against a polish steelmill company.   The customer
complained about onerous contract terms and in particular the requirement that it should pay
for the steel in advance of delivery.  The AMO first enquired whether the Steelmill company
had a dominant position.    The AMO analysed  the flow of imports, which turned to account
for more than 75 % of apparent consumption and enquired about formal barriers to trade,
which took the form of import duties in the range of 10-15%.   The AMO also undertook a16
customer survey which revealed that imported steel was of higher quality than domestic
products and that foreign firms provided a better service.  According to the AMO, the import
surcharge was not so large to render the foreign firms uncompetitive, given the higher quality
of their products.  On the basis of this evidence, the AMO considered that the Steelmill under
investigation only had around 10 % of the Polish market and hence could not be seen as
dominant.
This approach is odd.  It is clear that in order to compute market shares in any given
area, the total quantity being supplied to that area has to be taken into account (in the
denominator).    Accordingly, imported quantities into Poland had to be taken into account to
compute market shares.  However, the importance of imports into Poland suggests that
relevant antitrust market is broader than Poland.  As a consequence,  the market share that is
relevant to assess the dominance of Steelmill is not its market share in Poland but its market
share in the broader area that constitutes a relevant market (for instance CEFTA or CEFTA
and the EU).
 In the  Nitrogen case
13 , the AMO investigated a possible cartel between three
producers of Nitrogen fertiliser.  The parties denied the existence of an explicit or tacit
agreement between them.  They also argued however that their industry was unprofitable
because of  pressure form imports and admitted that they had collectively sought support from
the relevant ministries to shield them from foreign competition.    Hence, it appears that the
relevant market for Nitrogen fertilisers may actually be broader than Poland and that a cartel
among Polish producers could only operate profitably if it was protected from imports.   An
effective remedy to the situation would thus involve the removal of  import protection.  This
remedy was unfortunately not considered or advocated by the AMO.
These  cases illustrate that  while the AMO has taken into account foreign
competition, it has not  properly recognised its significance.   In particular,  it has not properly
distinguished between foreign competition which is relevant for market definition (short term
supply substitution) and foreign competition which is relevant for the assessment of
dominance (medium term entry).   Moreover, it has failed to  recognise that when short term
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
12 See decision reported in the Bulletin, issue 11, 1996.  Decision of July 1996, N° DDP 22/96.
13 Decision of september  7, 1994 - N° DO-I-50/S/2/94/DG - see bulletin N° 3, 1994.17
substitution from imports is strong,  the relevant market is broader and market shares that are
relevant for the analysis of dominance should be computed in that broader area.
At the opposite, there are a number of cases where the AMO did not consider foreign
competition even though it probably should have done so.    Fiat Auto Poland
14 is such a case.
In this case, the AMO considered a complaint against Fiat Auto Poland for onerous contract
terms with respect to the sale of the Fiat 126, Cinquecento and Uno.  The AMO investigated
first whether Fiat had a dominant position and suggested that the relevant market was the
market for  small passenger cars in Poland.  In that market, Fiat had a market share of 88 %
and hence, was considered dominant.  Still, the AMO did not consider whether imported
second hand cars (possibly larger ones) could be seen as close substitutes to new small cars
by Polish consumers.   Given the flood of imported second cars observed in the early years of
transition, this issue was presumably worth investigating.
Parallel imports is also a central issue at stake in the Sony
15 case.    This was a
complaint against the exclusive distribution system being implemented by Sony Poland.  The
complaint was lodged by Niku, a local company which was not granted the status of exclusive
dealer by  Sony.  Niku alleged that it did not obtain this status because it was routinely
importing original Sony equipment from other countries and in particular from Singapore.
Indeed, the contract between  Sony and its exclusive dealers prevented the latter from
undertaking parallel imports.   The AMO ruled that exclusive distribution systems were not
unlawful per se but that any dealer should be in a position to import equipment directly from
other sources.   In this respect, the decision of the AMO is in line with the approach adopted
by the EU which always insists on preserving the possibility for parallel imports in the case of
vertical restraints.    This practice has been much criticized (see for instance, Korah, 1990) on
the grounds that if inter-brand competition is sufficient, inducing intra-brand competition may
not be necessary.   Indeed, inducing intra-brand competition may reduce competition (and
market integration) if  in the absence of an exclusive distribution system, the firm
contemplating exports prefers to abstain from exporting at all.    Still,  the insistence on intra-
brand competition may be more sensible in the case of Sony Poland, because of reduced inter-
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brand competition (as documented by the applicant
16).    Hence, it appears that in this case,
the AMO has, for better reasons,  followed the approach commonly found in EU practice.
There are also a number of cases where the geographic market definition turned out to
be a central issue and where the analysis does not appear to be fully convincing.   For
instance, in the merger between two cement producers, Grosowice and Gorazdze,  the AMO
decided that each Voivode was a separate relevant market
17.  A Voivode was (at the time of
the case) a reasonably small territorial unit, which is on average about the size of a French
department (with about 50 Voivode for the whole of Poland).   The AMO cited the
importance of transport costs to justify its position but gave no figure.  Further analysis might
have been useful however given that in other jurisdictions (the EU or Switzerland for
instance), the relevant market is often considered to be national rather than regional.  There is
even some evidence that bulk imports of cement by ship from far away destination is
sometimes profitable.     In any event, the AMO considered  the effects of the concentration
on 12 distinct Voivode.  Given uncertainty about market definition, it would have been useful
to examine whether these Voivoide were or not contiguous.  Indeed, if they were, the scope
for the exercise of market power may have been greater.
Lack of some basic quantification is also a concern in another decision involving
Cement.  In this case, a cement company attempted to integrate vertically by acquiring
Faelbud, a company selling ready mix concrete as well as pre-formed concrete products.
This concentration was a concern because it had a horizontal dimension, as the (mother)
cement company appeared to control another company ( Prefabeton) selling ready mix
concrete and concrete products.    According to the AMO,  the relevant market was the
Voivode of Lublin (where the companies were active).   The concentration was prohibited and
the parties appealed.  The court dismissed the analysis of the AMO with respect to the
geographical market definition and ruled that the market for concrete products  should
encompass several Voivode.     The court found that it was economical to transport these
products over a distance of some 150 to 200 kms on the basis of evidence on transport costs
submitted by the parties.   Apart from the question of whether the evidence used by the court
                                                                
16 The applicant claimed that Sony had a dominant position in the market for high quality color television.
Whether this is a relevant antitrust market is of course debatable and no evidence was provided to that effect by
the applicant.
17 The decision of the AMO was appealed and reversed (see section 3.3. below).  However, the appeal did not
focus on market definition.19
was convincing (which is hard to assess), it is clear that a more detailed analysis of the
geographic market by the AMO (using transport costs but also observed prices and flows
across Voivoide) would have been useful.
To summarise, it appears that the analysis of competition across the geographic
dimension in the cases being reviewed often suffers from important shortcomings.    First,
there is at times a bit of a confusion between geographic market definition and the analysis of
dominance.  From this prospective, it would be useful for the AMO to adopt a clear definition
of what is meant by the relevant market.    At times, the AMO has adopted language which is
close to that found in the EU (in particular the notion that "market include such goods which
can be treated as substitutes in terms of application, use and price from the consumers'
standpoint).   Still, the AMO could usefully clarify the underlying principle of market
definition - such that a relevant antitrust market is one in which a hypothetical monopolist
could exercise some degree of market power.   This could be done through a set of published
guidelines.   Such guidelines could outline (as in the US or the EU) the types of factors that
will be taken into account at the stage of market definition and those that will be taken into
account for the analysis of dominance.
Second,  it seems that the AMO could have adopted a more systematic approach to
evaluate substitution across different geographical areas.  Quantification, when it is
undertaken, is limited to the evaluation of transport costs.  Clearly, much more could be done,
for instance in terms of  simple price comparisons across different territories, analysis of the
correlation of prices over time or analysis of  import and export flows, to name just a few.
3.2. Competition advocacy
According to their statute, the AMO and later the OCCP are supposed to participate in
the preparation of new laws.   Over the course of the last few years, the AMO and OCCP have
also actually taken part in the preparation of laws affecting trade and in  particular on the issue
of  “administration of turnover in goods and services with foreign countries”, the “protection
against imports at dumped prices into the Polish customs territory”, the “protection against
excessive imports of certain textiles and garments into the Polish customs territory” and the
“protection against excessive imports of certain goods into the Polish customs territory”.20
It is of course difficult to judge ex post whether the AMO and OCCP  were a  real
advocate of competition and whether they played an effective role.    According to Cadot et al
(2000),  there is a significant return to a more protectionist stance in Polish commercial policy
after the initial wave of  liberalisation.  This by itself is of course not an indication that the
competition authorities were ineffective.  It is also worth noting however that  the OCCP
expressed some dissatisfaction with the outcome of the working party on trade issues.
Looking at the views sometimes defended by the competition agency, as reported in their
Bulletin, some suspicion might also arise.  For instance, the insistence by the OCCP that
“some companies are of special importance for the national economy” might raise some
eyebrows.     The Nitrogen case mentioned above is also striking.  It is clear from the decision
that the firms under investigation for cartel behaviour had lobbied the appropriate ministries
to obtain some import protection.  What is puzzling is that the AMO did not challenge the
view that measures should be taken to make sure that domestic prices should be allowed to
increase in order to reflect the increase in domestic costs.  All what the AMO expressed
concern about is the existence of co-ordination in the market in raising prices.   The AMO did
not take the view that import competition was as important as domestic competition and did
not see joint action in a ministry to obtain protection as evidence of cartel behaviour.
If it is difficult to assess the outcome of competition advocacy, it appears however that
the institutional set-up has become less favourable for the agency in the pursuit of this role.
As mentioned above, the activities of the AMO have been modified in 1996.  But this  change
in the statute was accompanied by a significant institutional change.   Previously, the head
(President) of the competition office was accountable to the Prime minister.   The
Competition office did  not have the status of a full ministry but the President was still
routinely invited to attend the Council of Ministers,  without a vote
18.  The terms of
appointment for the President was also indefinite.
When the AMO was transformed into the OCCP, its President became accountable not
to the  Prime minister alone but to the Council of Ministers.  The President of the OCCP is no
longer invited to the Council of  Ministers.  He is now occasionally invited to the meetings of
top cabinet members and civil servants  who prepare the Council of Ministers.  The terms of
the office of the President is not specified.  In the draft new law, a period of five years is
                                                                
18 This practice was initiated by Anna Fornalcyk, the first President of the AMO who was very influential and
widely respected.  The practice was not discontinued for its successors.21
considered and it is proposed that no President should have more than two succeeding terms
of office.     One can wonder whether this approach is wise ; given that elections for
parliament take place every four years, the President would then have an horizon which
broadly coincides with the electoral cycle.     Finally,  it may also be worth noting that the first
president of the OCCP stayed less than three years in office.  He was also removed after the
election in 1997 and replaced by somebody with no experience in competition matters.
Overall, it seems that the reform has reduced the standing of the competition authority
which is now less powerful than before.     These developments  may or may not affect the
independence of the agency with respect to decision making on individual cases but it almost
certainly reduces the effectiveness of the agency as an advocate of competition ;  first, the
agency has less standing than before and can be expected to be less of a counter-weight
against powerful ministries (like the ministry of the economy) which may be closer to
particular interests.  From this perspective, it may be interesting to note that the competition
agency has recently lost much of its competence which respect to state aids, which are now
the sole responsibility of the ministry of the economy.  Second,  to the extent that the
President is politically exposed, he is less likely to confront powerful interests and may thus
in some circumstances be less vigorous in its advocacy of competition.
3.3. Foreign direct investment
As mentioned above, competition policy sometimes pursues broader objectives than
simply ensuring effective competition.     Competition agencies may thus wish to bring about
particular industry configurations.  With respect to foreign firms, there may be a tendency for
antitrust authorities to favour foreign direct investment because they expect that they will
bring about wider benefits like technology transfers.  On the other hand, there may be a
concern that control  over domestic activities will be lost to foreign investors and this concern
may lead to a bias against foreign direct investment.
Merger control is also an area where multiple objectives will often come into play.
This is indeed the area where antitrust policy affects the industry structure most directly and
hence where particular industry configurations can be  most easily engineered.   In most
jurisdictions, industrial policy is not directly recognised as a legitimate objective of  merger
control but a number of jurisdictions (in particular the US, the UK and Germany) allow for a22
so called efficiency defence.  That is, mergers which bring about significant efficiencies will
be more likely to be allowed.   The evaluation of potential efficiencies is however often very
speculative and the very notion of potential efficiencies is somewhat vague.  For instance, it
could include anything from an improvement in productivity for the merging firms to induced
benefit for the organisation of the industry, the region  and the labour market.  As a result,
there is a risk that efficiency defences will act a as veil under which industrial policy will
creep in.
Unlike other transition economies, Poland does not formally allow for efficiency
defences or  broad considerations  in merger control.    It has a strict standard of competition
in terms of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.   However, also unlike other
transition economies, the AMO has no duty to prohibit mergers  which do not meet the
standards
19.  Accordingly, the statute allows for broad discretion at the level of agency.
There are a number of cases where  the AMO has used its discretion and decided not
to prohibit mergers.  At the same tine, the AMO  has been quite transparent  in its decisions
about its motivations and those are revealing.
The acquisition of Brevopola by Heineken in 1998 raised concern,  according to the
AMO,  because the merged entity would control a large share of the beer distributors.   It is
hard to tell whether the competition concern  of the  agency were well founded.   Indeed, it is
not clear from the decision what share of the actual distribution networks would be controlled
by the merged entity and whether the merger actually made matters worse for competitors (as
it seems that both Brevopola and Heineken operated with exclusive distributors before the
merger).  Whatever the merit of the argument,  the AMO reported that it could obtain
significant commitments from Heineken and that in view of these commitments would allow
the concentration to go through.  These undertakings are such that Heineken commits to buy
hay (Houblon) from Poland for as much as 25 % of its requirements in 1999 and   50 % for at
least five years thereafter and as long as it market share is above 35 % ,  such that Heineken
will invest as least 2 million $ in to the transformation of hay within three years and such that
it will maintain the production of some specified products.
                                                                
19 The draft revision of the law introduces both an efficiency defense and a duty to prohibit if the standard is not
met.  From this perspective,  the new statute  would converge towards that found in other transition economies.
But it would diverge from the EU standards in terns of efficiency defense.23
These undertakings are clearly not designed to meet particular competition concerns.
At best, they reflect an active policy of industrial engineering being pursued by the AMO.   At
worst, they might reveal a situation where a profitable dominant position in the Polish market
has been "sold off" to a foreign buyer (by the AMO !).
The suspicion that a profitable market position could have  been auctioned off to
foreign buyers also clearly arises in the acquisition of  Polam-Pabianice SA by  Philips
Lighting Holding.   As mentioned above, the competitive analysis of this concentration is not
fully convincing and there are some reasons to think that this merger may be seriously anti-
competitive (at least relative to some alternatives involving for instance the break up of
Polam-Pabianice into several units).    The decision also outlines the reasons as to why the
merger was not prohibited and makes a systematic comparison between the undertakings
offered by Philips and those offered by a rival foreign buyer (Osram).   In particular, it
appears that Philips was selected because it was offering a larger investment, provided
employment guarantees for longer and could commit (given the characteristics of its own
product range) to discontinue fewer products originally offered by Polam-Pabianice.
The acquisition of Grosowice by Gorazdze  discussed above is also revealing.   This
acquisition was prohibited by the AMO but the decision was appealed in Court and reversed.
As indicated in the Court proceeeding, Gorazdze is also owned by CBR Baltics (a Dutch
subsidiary of CBR, the multinational cement company of Belgian origin).    The original
AMO decision focused mostly on the competitive analysis of the merger.  It noted that
Grosowice was operating with old equipment and was not profitable but declined to apply the
failing firm defence.   The Court proceedings  reveal a wholly different approach.  First, the
Court decisions paint a much more pessimistic picture of  Grosowice's situation and appealed
to the failing firm defence.  The court  emphasised  Grosowice's  lack of reserves of raw
material, its long term losses and even the recent flooding of its plant.   These arguments
sound as if they were extracted from the parties' pleading and  should presumably not be
sufficient to justify the application of the failing firm defence (which normally requires to
verify that no alternative which involves less anti-competitive effects was available).
Second, and most importantly, the Court also dwelt at length on the benefits accruing
from the acquisition.  The catalogue of benefits is impressive ranging from technology24
transfer, the scope for specialisation of plants, the synergies in marketing and the
improvement of the environment.  It also appears that the Court asked CBR to submit a
detailed business plan, specifying the size of its planned investment, the details of it social
plans and its strategy towards environmental clean up.    At the end, the Court cleared the
acquisition, emphasising that the presence of foreign firm was a decisive factor in its ruling.
Overall, these three cases certainly illustrate that the AMO and the Court have been at
times willing to pursue objectives of industrial policy.  It even appears that domestic firms
with strong marketing positions have been auctioned of  to foreign buyers in exchange for
commitments which are unrelated to the competitive situation.  One would expect  finance or
industry ministries to adopt such an approach, in particular in the context of privatisation.
What is a source of concern is that the competition agency, not only accepts this approach, but
seems to actively pursue it itself.    This observation is particularly worrying in Poland where
large scale privatisation has started much later than in other countries and is far from being
completed.
The attitude towards foreign competition is also more ambiguous than the attitude
towards initial foreign direct investment.   This appears in a number of internal studies
undertaken by the AMO.  For instance, the AMO undertook a study in 1996 to evaluate the
potential damage that foreign supermarkets were inflicting on local distributors.  The
objective of this study is by itself puzzling but its arguments are also at times a source of
concern: the study observes as a main argument in favour of foreign competitors that they sell
a majority of goods produced in Poland.  This admission has potentially mercantilist
undertones that you would not expect from an antitrust agency.
Fiat Auto Poland is another case along those lines.    In this decision, the AMO was
investigating onerous contract terms in Poland and compared the pricing policies of  Fiat in
Poland with that observed in other countries.  It also found that Fiat was selling many more
units in other countries than in Poland (ten times more) at a time when there were long delays
for delivery in Poland.    This, according to the AMO, as evidence that Fiat held a dominant
position in Poland.  Still,  it seems that the choice between export and domestic sales should
be left to Fiat and it would be unreasonable to impose on Fiat the obligation to serve domestic
customers first.   This suggestion has again some troubling undertones when it comes to the
consideration of foreign markets.25
4. Hungary
The Hungarian competition statute was enacted in 1990 and was substantially revised
in 1996.   This statute contains provisions relating to  anti-competitive practices (agreements,
abuse of dominance)  and merger control but also consumers fraud and unfair market
practices.  The amendments extended the coverage of the law to include practices taking place
abroad but having an effect on the territory of Hungary (see above).     Amendments with
respect to agreements and abuse of dominance also achieved a substantial approximation of
the Hungarian provisions  to corresponding European ones.   For instance, the prohibition of
vertical agreements was extended (the original provision only covered resale price
maintenance), the scope of the prohibition towards agreements has adopted the exact language
of Art. 81 (namely the "prevention, restriction and distortion of competition"),  agreements
which fall under the prohibition have been made void, the concept dominance has abandoned
reference to market share thresholds and is defined in terms of the "ability to act
independently to a great extent from other market participants" and  the exemplary list of
abuses now mimics almost exactly that found under Art. 82.
With respect to mergers, differences with the European statute have widened.  In
addition to minor changes with respect to the thresholds and the definition of a concentration,
the amendment has profoundly changed the nature of control : whereas in the original statutes,
the Competition agency had to prohibit mergers which impeded the formation, development
or continuation of competition, the Competition agency is now under the obligation not to
prohibit mergers which do not create or strengthen a dominant position.     Hence, like the
Polish AMO but unlike the Merger Task Force,  the Hungarian Competition agency may
choose not to prohibit mergers which create or strengthen a dominant position.
Table 4.  Activity of the Hungarian competition authority
Decisions 96-June 97 June- Dec 97 98
































As indicated in table 4, the workload of the Hungarian agency with respect to
consumer fraud, agreements and potential abuse of dominance has remained roughly constant.
Over time the number of merger cases has however increased by about 50 %.    This increase
in the workload has been accommodated without a concomitant increase in resources (see
table 5).     It is partly associated with the change in the legal framework which extended the
scope of merger control to foreign firms (See above).
Table 5 Resources of the Hungarian competition authority
95 96 97 98
Budget ($ Mio) 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Personnel 115 106 106 111
4.1. Foreign competition
The Hungarian competition agency has so far n ever taken the view that the relevant
market could be broader than Hungary.   However, foreign competition has been taken into
account in a number of cases as a relevant factor to assess dominance.    Such an approach has
important drawbacks that we discuss first.  We will subsequently turn to cases where the
relevant market could be narrower than the entire territory of Hungary.
4.1.1.  Hungary versus a broader area
The  Hollow Ware Orosháza/Glassworks Sajószentpéter merger provides a  good
illustration of the trade-off that arises when foreign competition is not fully taken into account27
at the level of market definition.     Both  Hollow Ware Orosháza and  Glassworks
Sajószentpéter manufacture and distribute preserve jars and glass bottles.   The competition
Council considered that hollow glass was the relevant product market because of limited
substitution with other products and, without much discussion, that the relevant geographic
market was Hungary.   On the market for hollow glass, the merged entity had a market share
of 67 % in Hungary (where 90 % of their sales were concentrated).    Still,  when assessing
the potential dominance of the merged entity, the Council appealed to the importance of
imports, which accounted for 29 % of sales in Hungary.  The Council also observed that
imports had increased by 120 % between 1995 and 1997 and that import duties had fallen
from 19.8 % in 1995 to zero in 1997.     The Council emphasised that imports, in particular
from neighbouring countries, would seriously constrain the merged entity in its pricing policy
and welcome import pressure as a mechanism to discipline domestic producers and force
them to rationalise production.    The concentration was authorised without remedy.
 One can wonder whether on the face of the evidence provided by the Council the
relevant geographic market for hollow ware should not be broader than Hungary.   The
imports figures in particular are suggestive of a broader market, possibly extending to
CEFTA.   Of course, if the relevant market had been broader, to the extent that the market
share of the merged entity in that alternative market would have been smaller (according to
the Hungarian competition agency),  it is likely that the concentration would also have been
allowed.   Arguably,  whether foreign competition is considered at the level of market
definition or at the stage of the analysis of dominance would not have mattered for the
outcome in this particular case.
However, it seems that a proper market definition, which fully recognises the
importance of  foreign competition,  provides a useful discipline and allows for an evaluation
of competition which is better informed.     For instance, in the  Hollow Ware case the
significance of  imports as a competitive constrain could not be assessed precisely because
there was no information on the breakdown of imports by competitors.  Arguably, whether
imports were achieved by a small number of foreign competitors or by a large number of
competitors would matter to assess the significance of the competitive constraint.   The
Council ended up computing the change in the Herfindahl index associated with the
concentration assuming that all imports were undertaken by a single firm.  The resulting
concentration (an impressive 5340 after the concentration) is almost surely biased upwards.28
By contrast, if the Council had considered that the relevant market was broader, it would have
computed market shares in that market using the actual shares of the competitors and it would
have obtained a more precise assessment of the competitive conditions.
Obtaining information about market shares in broader area that the national market is
possibly more difficult even though such information can probably be requested from
merging parties.   This might point to a step by step approach whereby the market is first
deemed to be national and market shares are computed in that area.  Only if a potential
problem of dominance is observed in that area would the agency consider obtaining
information about market shares for alternative (broader) relevant markets.   This seems to be
the approach which is currently espoused by the Hungarian agency.
The presumption that if there is no issue of dominance in a narrow market, there will a
fortiori not be any in a broader is however not entirely sound.  Indeed,  if the distribution of
firms’ sales is highly asymmetric, it is quite possible that  market shares are small in a
particular subset of the relevant market and would not trigger any concern in that region but
still large in the relevant market as a whole.   Accordingly, narrow markets do not always
provide a reliable screen of the competition problems that can arise in broader areas.
On the whole, it seems that the approach of the Hungarian agency has significant
drawbacks and it might find it useful to consider foreign competition explicitly at the level of
market definition.  Indeed, the hollow ware case is not an isolated event.   There are a  number
of cases where foreign competition has been appealed to in the analysis of dominance in a
manner which is less than fully transparent.
For instance, in the Graboplast /Keszta-Dunawall case,  the merging parties had more
than 30 % of the market for wallpaper in Hungary.  The concentration was allowed because
imports accounted for 2/3 of sales, which again suggests that the relevant market was broader.
In the Nestlé/Jupiter case,   the acquisition by Nestlé of a domestic producer of animal (dog
and cat) food was allowed because imports accounted for more than 50 % of sales.   Particular
concerns about market power could however arise in this case because Nestlé is presumably
also an important supplier in neighbouring markets.   Only a proper analysis of  competition
in broader areas could answer this concern.   A similar concern could arise in the Gyõri
Keksz/Stollwerck case,  where United Biscuits (the owner of the Gyõri Keksz) gained control29
of Stollwerck  and achieved  a market share of  64 % in the market for special biscuits.   The
transaction was cleared because of potential imports from CEFTA but it is not clear what is
the market share of United Biscuits in neighbouring markets.   Finally, in the Henkel/Kemikál
Barcs case,  Henkel gained control of Kemikál Barcs, which held 25 % of the market for
building chemicals.    The Council argued that there was strong competition from imports but
also acknowledged that Henkel was a significant importer of building material.  It is not clear
from the decision what is the combined market share of imports and domestic sales that will
be controlled by the merged entity.
It is worth re-emphasizing at this stage that the analysis of published decisions that we
have undertaken is not meant to evaluate whether decisions were “right” or “wrong”.  Indeed,
upon discussions with the agency, it appeared that many of the issues discussed in the
previous paragraphs were well understood by the agency and that the potential shortcomings
that that we mention in some decisions would not have been decisive.     It seems, however,
for the sake of transparency and consistency in decision making that the full reasoning of the
agency should appear in the decision.
4.1.2. Regional markets
There are a number of decisions where the Competition authority could arguably have
taken the view that the market was regional rather than national.   After having discussed the
matter  with the authority, it appeared that regional markets had been considered during the
proceedings but that the full analysis that had been undertaken was not reflected in the
published decision.
For instance, the Council considered two merger cases in the oil industry, namely the
BP/Mobil merger and the OVM Hungaria/Áfor/Benzinkút  merger.  Both instances involved
the distribution of petrol through local stations.   Given limited opportunities for demand
substitution, there is a strong presumption that market for the distribution of petrol are
regional (as confirmed by the recent EU Commission decisions in the Exxon/Mobil or Tota
Fina/Elf  decisions).    Even though the published decision is silent on the matter, it appears
that the Hungarian competition agency actually considered regional markets and checked
whether the merger would increase concentration at the regional level.30
Similarly, in the Bank Ausztria/Creditanstalt merger,  the authority considered in the
published decision that the relevant market was the credit market in Hungary.   In bank
mergers, it is however customary to consider very narrow markets (see Neven and von
Ungern, 1998,  for a survey).  Again, it emerged from discussion with the authority that
narrow markets had been considered during the investigation.
Even if in the approach followed by the authority was probably adequate in these two
cases,  it seems that for the sake of  legal certainty, the authority should be more transparent in
published decisions and explain its motivation in full.
There is however one case where arguably the Council has not considered that the
markets  could be regional and possibly should have done so.  In the Lapker Rt/Buvihir jsc
case, the Hungarian post office privatised seven newspaper distributors though a tender
procedure.  The same company, Lapker, won all seven tenders and  asked the authority for
authorisation to acquire control in the companies that it had won.   The authority gave the
authorisation but failed to consider (at least in the published decision) whether the distribution
companies has overlapping networks.  Arguably, markets for the distributions of newspapers
are regional and the competitive impact of  a joint control of all seven companies would
indeed depend on their geographical coverage.  For instance,  if all seven companies are
active in different regions, the competitive impact of the transaction will be reduced by
comparison with a situation in which all seven companies are active in the same area.
The authority also handled a merger notification where the extent of the geographic
market turned out to be a central issue.    In the Hajdútej Tejipari Ltd /Lakto 2000 case,
Hajdútej Tejipari (controlled by  Nutricia of the Netherlands) and active in the milk
processing industry gained control of  Lakto 2000, another milk processing firm active in the
same region (Szabolcstej).  In that region (four counties of East Hungary), the merged entity
would control about 90 % of the milk purchased from farmers.  In addition, it appeared that
Nutricia was also controlling another dairy producer in an adjacent region.  The authority
considered however that the transportation cost of fresh milk was relatively small and that
supply substitution would be important.   That is, one could expect dairy producers to
organise the collection of milk from other regions if the merged entity would exercise buyer
power towards the small farmers.   The reasoning of the authority seems convincing.  One can
only regret that its argument about supply substitution was not supported by factual evidence.31
In the end the authority considered that the relevant geographic market was the Eastern part of
Hungary where the market share of the merged entity  amounts to some 30-35% and the
merger was allowed.
4.2. Competition advocacy
According Fingleton et al. (1996), the Hungarian competition agency has been fairly
independent  from its inception.  However, these authors also note that this independence may
have been achieved at the cost of limiting the role of the agency in terms of competition
advocacy, in particular regarding the privatisation process.
Two remarks are in order.  First, it appears that if anything the independence of the
authority has been enhanced in the last few years.    The independence of the president and
vice-presidents has arguably been improved;  candidates are now subject to a parliamentary
hearing before their nomination by the Prime Minister.   Such enhanced accountability to
parliament further limits the scope that the Prime Minister might have in nominating
inadequate candidates.  The independence of the council members with respect the President
of the office has also been improved.   Council members are now nominated by the President
of the Republic (and no longer by the President of the office) for an indefinite period of time.
They can only be dismissed by the President of the Republic (formerly the President of the
office) and only on grounds that are identical to those applied to judges.
Second, the competition authority seems to play  a regular role in the implementation
of trade policy.  The authority is represented in both the market protection and tariff
committees and apparently argues regularly against targeted reductions in import tariff rates
as well as temporary import surcharges.  According to the authority,  requests for temporary
protection have not increased over time and protection has only been granted to declining
industries like steel and heavy chemicals.   There is also, according to the authority, a broad
scepticism towards individual waivers in import duties.
4.3. Foreign direct investment
As illustrated above in the case of Poland, competition agencies can sometimes pursue
objectives that may be broader than maintaining effective competition, in particular in the32
area of merger control where efficiency defences can be used as cover for industrial policy.
Under the new law, the competition authority does not have to prohibit mergers which create
or reinforce dominant position as a result of which effective competition is reduced.  Hence, a
lax attitude towards mergers could also be associated with  underlying objectives of the
competition authority which for instance favour industrial consolidation.
There is at least one case for which suspicion arises.  In the Sugar case, the
competition authority allowed one large sugar producer to buy two smaller companies
controlled by another large sugar producer.  The effect of the merger was to create a balanced
triopoly in the Sugar market.   The authority found that the symmetric structure resulting from
this operation was pro-competitive.  Still, one could certainly argue that the formation of a
symmetric triopoly  should help producers in achieving effective tacit co-ordination.
The Lapker Rt/Buvihir Rt case mentioned above is also odd.   The authority argued
that joint control of the seven distribution companies auctioned off by the post office should
be allowed because it would not deteriorate the situation by comparison with that found
before privatisation (when the Post office controlled all seven).   But of course,  one of the
main objective of privatisation is presumably to improve the competitive structure and as
advocates of competition, the authority should not be satisfied with the status quo.   One can
also wonder whether the fact that Lapker is a foreign company played any role in the decision.
The importance of the technological transfer expected from foreign acquisition is also
explicitly mentioned in the Henkel/Kemikál Barcs decision.    The prospect for restructuring
and enhanced export potential associated with a foreign partner is also considered in that
decision.    Similar consideration can be found in the Bestfood/Globus case in which a dutch
company acquired a Hungarian producer of food products, and again in the  Egis
Pharmaceuticals/Nutricia case  in which a joint venture was formed between a foreign
company (Nutricia) and a Hungarian firm to produce and sell baby foods.
Hence, it seems that the attitude towards foreign direct investment is quite favourable.
5. The Czech republic33
The Czech Competition Authority is an independent administrative the decisions of
which can be appealed in front of a domestic court (a High Court, which in turn, has de facto
become specialised in competition law cases).
Approximately thirty five professionals work in the Czech Competition Authority.
The workload has been increasing in particular with respect to agreements and abuse of
dominance (see table 6).  Merger notifications have increased by a factor of more than 3
between 1992 and 1996 and seem to have stabilised thereafter at around 60 notifications per
year
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Mergers 74 58 57
The Czech Competition Authority applies the Act on the Protection of Economic
Competition of January 30 1991 (as amended by Acts 495/1992 and 286/1993, see Fingleton
et al. (1996) for details).
This competition law contains a provision on merger control which has direct
implications for the treatment of cases with an international dimension.    The provision reads
as follows :
« (1)  Concentrations which distort or m ay distort economic competition shall be
subject to approval by the Ministry.  Competition shall be deemed distorted if the
merging undertakings’ shares exceed 30% of the total turnover in the nation-wide or
local market for the given product.
                                                                
20 Source:  See DAFFE/CLP(99) 14/26, OECD/DAFFE, Annual Report on Competition Policy in the Czech
Republic, 23 April 1999.34
(2)  The Ministry shall approve of a concentration if the applying competitors prove
that any detriment which may result from the distortion of competition will be
outweighed by the economic benefits brought about by this concentration....
(3)  Competitors are obliged to apply to the Ministry for approval of a concentration
between undertakings under paragraph (1). »
21
Two remarks are in order.  First, it appears that only mergers that can be presumed to
be unlawful have to be notified.    Second, and more importantly, all concentrations which
lead to a market share of 30 % in the Czech republic (or part of it)  are deemed to distort
competition.    This implies that foreign competition cannot be fully taken into account.
Indeed, the competition authority cannot, according to the statute, allow a merger which leads
to a market share of 30 % in the Czech simply because the relevant antitrust market is broader
or because foreign competition is strong.
As a consequence, international mergers which take place in a broader relevant market
can only be allowed in the Czech republic (when they have a market share above 30 %)  if
they can invoke an efficiency defence (see second paragraph).
Of course, the Czech Competition Authority does not have to automatically exercise
jurisdiction in such case  and examine whether the notified merger complies or not with the
criteria laid down in the Act (essentially whether an efficiency defence can be accepted under
the circumstances).  In fact, the Czech Competition Authority could  very well examine
whether it is reasonable for another national authority to intervene and examine conformity of
the notified merger with its own national laws.    There is no evidence  however that the
Czech authority ever declined to assert jurisdiction in such cases (and indeed  such deference
is rarely, if ever,  encountered  in other jurisdictions).
5.1. Foreign competition
Let us first consider agreements and abuse of dominance.  The Czech Competition
Authority applied, since 1996, its own law on eight (8) cases of inbound trade (relating to
either agreements and/or concerted practices -- horizontal/vertical restraints—, or abuse of
                                                                
21 We should note that we work from an official translation in English of the Act provided to us by the Czech
Competition Authority.35
dominant position in the Czech market), namely 1 case in 1996, 4 in 1997, 2 in 1998 and 1 in
1999
22.
Given the very limited number of such cases, it is hard to draw firm conclusions
regarding the way in which the Czech Competition Authority treats agreements and abuse of
dominance with an international dimension.
However, when it comes to defining the relevant geographic market, the 'rule of
thumb' applied by the Czechs is to define an area within which conditions for competition are
to a large extent homogeneous.
It also appears that when defining the geographic market, the Czech Competition
Authority will take into account production characteristics, fluctuation of prices and transport
costs.
Let us now turn to mergers.  As indicated above, there is large number of  such cases.
In addition,  the Czech Competition Authority  often examined mergers between at least one
foreign and one Czech undertaking and sometimes between two foreign undertakings.  This
element (foreign nationality of one of the undertakings involved) in itself provides an
international dimension to the case handled by the Authority and might call for some form of
co-operation.
The fact that many foreign entities were involved is in itself not surprising.  The
gradual opening up of the Czech economy led to penetration of the Czech market through
investment or through trade by foreign companies.  And, as stated above,  all mergers which
lead to market share of 30 % in the Czech republic or a substantial part of it have to be
notified
For the purposes of this study, we examined cases with a clear international
dimension.  We believe that such cases are the most representative to demonstrate a certain
trend in antitrust enforcement.  Hence we chose eight cases of mergers notifications involving
solely foreign companies.  These cases are listed in table 7.
                                                                
22 Source:  Czech Competition Authority36
Table 7. Merger cases involving foreign companies in the Czech republic
No File Number Date of Decision Applicants Outcome
1. S7/97-220 3.7.1997 Fresenius/ approved
WR Grace
2. S64/97-210 1.8.1997 Hewlett-Packard/ approved
Verifone
3. S84/97-220/1086 8.12.1997 Procter&Gamble/ approved
Tambrands
4. S82/98-220/1665 17.7.1998 Exxon/Shell approved
5. S91/98-220/1666 23.7.1998 Lubrizol/BP approved
6. S145A/98-220/3477 9.12.1998 GE/Elscint procedural errors
7. S137/98-220/3559 18.12.1998 Johnson &Johnson/ approved
DePuy
8. S21/99-850/99-210 13.5.1999 Deutsche Post/ approved
Danzas
In case 1, the applicants were of German and US nationality;  in cases 2, 3 and 4 both
US,  in case 5 one US, one UK;  in case 6 one US, one Israel;  in case 7, both US, in case 8,
one German and one Swiss.
Some of the foreign entities have their subsidiaries incorporated under Czech laws in
the Czech Republic (i.e,  case 3, where Procter & Gamble’s subsidiary, Rakona a.s., is
incorporated under Czech laws).  However, the fact that the applicant owns such a subsidiary
has had no impact in the Czech Competition Authority’s appreciation of the undertakings at37
hand as bearing a foreign nationality.  What counted is whether the turnover-threshold was
surpassed independently of the nationality of the undertakings at hand (‘effects’).
 In all these cases, the Czech Competition Authority has considered that the relevant
geographic market was the Czech republic and has asserted that the geographic market can at
the maximum extend to the Czech Republic.   As indicated above, this approach is indeed
dictated by the legal framework.     In order to assess whether regional markets would be
appropriate, the Czech authority has considered whether the conditions of competition were
homogenous (as in the case of agreements, see above).
The analysis of the case law thus confirms that the Czech legal framework has a bias
towards potentially narrow market definitions.   The importance of foreign competition cannot
be fully recognised in this framework.    Mergers that take place in a broader relevant market
can only be allowed on the basis of an efficiency defence.
5.2. Efficiency defence and foreign direct investment
In the overwhelming majority of  merger cases, the Czech Competition Authority
ended up with a favourable decision.  According to the Czech Competition Authority, the sole
valid prohibition of a notified merger took place in 1996 in re:  REC Mankovice,
s.r.o/Veterinarni asanacni ustav Tisice a.s.  In this case, the relevant market was defined as
consisting of two markets, namely the market for veterinary sanitation of animal waste and
the market for animal based proteinous powder.  The concentration was not approved due to
the high concentration in both markets, the high barriers to entry as well as to the
strengthening of their market power, already connected to each other through capital and
personnel links.
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As stated above, all eight notified mergers were also approved.     Typically, the Czech
Competition Authority will accept mergers that (i)  enable a better product-quality ;(ii)  result
in more efficient (cost-saving) production (cases 4 and 5) ;(iii)  result in the supply of new or
                                                                
23 We note a discrepancy here with the aforementioned OECD report which mentions (p. 9) that a valid
prohibition was pronounced on two occasions, but does not contain any further information with respect to these
cases.  The Czech Competition Authority has repeatedly stated that they are aware of only one such case.38
value-added services (case 7).     It does not appear from the decision that claims o f
efficiency gains are given a full critical hearing by the authority.
The Czech authority thus appears to be rather flexible when it comes to efficiency
considerations.   Its bias against international mergers with respect to the evaluation of
international competition seems to be compensated by a possibly lenient consideration of
efficiency claims.
5.3.   Consistency across jurisdictions
Given that the international mergers reviewed above have been considered by other
jurisdictions, it is interesting to wonder whether the Czech Competition Authority has taken
notice of parallel procedures and possibly co-operated with other agencies.
With respect to the relevant product market, it appears that the Czech Competition
Authority consistently applies a criterium which is formally close to that found in the EU.  A
relevant product market typically includes all identical and substitutable products, the latter
being defined as those that taking into account their qualities, price, end-use, can substitute
the ‘inner’ circle of identical products.
Hence, the Czech Competition Authority when defining whether two products are
substitutable will: (i)  focus on their detailed description; (ii)  compare their end-uses and (iii)
analyse the structure of their supplies.
In some cases, a reference is made to decisions by the European Community (EC) or
another national competition authority.  Such references usually act as confirmation regarding
the correctness of the outcome reached by the Czech Competition Authority (i.e., in case 3,
the Czech Competition Authority mentions that a similar outcome was reached by the EC).
Consistency can be appreciated only if certain threshold criteria regarding
comparability are met:  cases  4 and 5 meet such criteria, since they relate to the same relevant
product market.  On both occasions, the relevant product market was defined in a  quasi
identical manner.39
On a number of cases, reference has been made to decisions of the EC or other
national competition authorities.  The following examples illustrate this point :
(i)  case 3 :  the Czech Authority, when analysing substitutability, arrived at the same
conclusion as the EC and added an explicit reference to EC decision 94/893 to
illustrate this point ;
(ii)  case 4 :  the Czech Authority reflects in the ratio decidendi of its decision that it
was informed by the applicants that their merger had already been approved by the
EC ;
(iii)  case 5 :  the Czech Authority reflects in the ratio decidendi of its decision that it
was informed by the applicants that their merger had not been previously notified to
the EC since, given its importance, it did not fall within the scope of the EC
jurisdiction.  The merger was nevertheless notified to the national competition
authorities of Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Germany, United Kingdom (as well as to the
authorities of Australia, the Slovak Republic and the US).  None of these authorities
had reached a conclusion by the time the Czech Authority had issued its decision and
there is no evidence of ‘horizontal’ co-operation between the Czech Authority and
another national authority (‘horizontal’ as opposed to ‘vertical’ co-operation that we
use to qualify the links between the Czech Competition Authority and DG IV) ;
(iv)  case 7 :  the Czech Authority stated that the merger at hand had already been
approved by DG IV ;
(v)  case 8 :  the Czech Authority states that its product market definition is consistent
with that reached by DG IV and cites the relevant EC decisions (TNT/GD Net No
IV/M102 dating from 1991 and Deutsche Post/Danzas No IV/M from 1999).
Hence, we can conclude that the Czech Competition Authority, when appropriate (that
is, even if not informed to this effect by the applicants) will check the outcome (and the
process leading to the outcome) and reflect it in its decision in order to confirm the
conclusions reached.  Since there are no reported cases of divergent conclusions reached by
the Czech Authority and DG IV, it is at this stage impossible to state the attitude that the
Czech Authority would follow in such cases.
6.  Conclusion40
  A number of conclusions emerge from our review of the antitrust practice in cases
with an international dimension.
First,  there has not been any conflict in the allocation of jurisdiction between Poland,
Hungary and the Czech republic on the one hand and the EU on the other hand.   The Europe
agreemeents have however been largely dormant even at the level of consultation and the
absence of conflict is probably associated,  to some extent, with limited integration between
the EU and the countries under review so that few cases could have arisen in the first place.
The absence of conflict is also probably associated with a fairly favourable, if not permissive,
attitude towards foreign firms in Central European Countries so that few European firms have
complained to the EU (arguably Community firms would indeed be the first to call on the EU
to assert jurisdiction).   The Europe Agreements, which have given rise to so much
controversy in Hungary,  are thus likely to become obsolete (upon accession) before they get
a chance of being seriously activated.   That is not say however that this agreement had not
effect.  Clearly, for antitrust authorities in Central Europe, the prospect that they may have to
implement European law in addition to their own law has given them as strong incentive to
approximate the latter with the former.   Hence, the Europe Agreements will probably be
remembered by economic historians more as tool to foster convergence in anti-trust practice
than an instrument to regulate the allocation of jurisdiction.
Second, the definition of the relevant geographic market suffers from significant
shortcomings in each country under review, but to a different degree. Overall, there is a
general bias in favour of narrow market definition, which is well illustrated by the fact that
none of the authority has ever considered that the market was broader than their national
territory (even though there are clear indications in some cases that the market was broader).
In the Czech republic, the legal framework introduces the presumption of a prohibition for
mergers on the basis of a market share in the domestic economy.  This framework does not
allow for mergers meeting the threshold to be waived simply because the relevant market is
broader than the Czech republic.   Accordingly, there is a strong bias against international
mergers in the Czech republic with respect to the evaluation of international competition.  In
Poland, there is at times a bit of a confusion between geographic market definition and the
analysis of dominance.  In Hungary, foreign competition is only considered as a relevant
factor to assess dominance.   A proper market definition, which fully recognises the
importance of foreign competition would allow for an evaluation of competition which is41
better informed.  In Poland and Hungary, the shortcomings of the current approach could be
easily remedied.   From this prospective, it would useful for the antitrust agencies to adopt a
clear definition of what is meant by the relevant market for instance through a set of published
guidelines.  Such guidelines could outline the types of factors that will be taken into account
at the stage of market definition and those that will be taken into account for the analysis of
dominance.    All three countries should also be encouraged to rely on a more quantitative
approach in delineating the market and to publish their reasoning and supporting evidence in
full.
Third, we observe that anti-trust agencies have attempted to advocate competiton in
the formulation of trade policy.   The evolution of their independence is however mixed.
There are some worrying signs that the Polish agency has become less independent whereas
the Hungarian agency has probably become even more independent.
Fourth, it appears that anti-trust agencies in all three countries could be pursuing
objectives of industial policy in the exercise of merger control.   The situation gives rise to
particular concern in Poland  where the suspicion arises that profitable market positions have
been auctioned off to foreign buyers in exchange for commitments which are unrelated to the
competitive situation.   In the other two countries,  it seems that the attitute towards foreign
firms has been quite favourable.     For instance, the prospect for restructuring or technology
transfer associated with foreign ownerhip is often cited as a benefit which can trump concerns
about reduction of effective competition.42
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